With the emergence of inexpensive network components and high-speed network services, a variety of network-capable electronic devices have become available. Typical examples of such devices include printers, network access storage (NAS), and video recorders. Because software on these devices is not always kept up-to-date, the devices are susceptible to intra-localarea-network (LAN) attacks. In this paper, a novel network system architecture is proposed to protect network devices from intra-LAN attacks by dynamically isolating infected devices with OpenFlow. Preliminary evaluation results demonstrate that the architecture is effective in actual LAN environments.
Introduction
The emergence of inexpensive network components and high-speed network services has led to a variety of network-capable electronic devices becoming available. Typical network-capable examples include printers, network access storage (NAS), and video recorders. The embedded software used in these devices is generally developed on an operating system (OS), such as Linux, ITRON, [1] and Windows family. In a survey of embedded systems published by Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) of Japanese goverment,, the top three target OSs and their respective share are (1) ITRON (22.5%), (2) Linux (15.9%), and (3) Windows family (20.0%), as shown in Fig.1 .
In addition to the usage of an OS, middleware is also widely used for development of the network devices. Fig.2 shows a part of another survey published by MITI, indicating that more than 60% of embedded systems deploy network protocol as well as device drivers. This means that the software for network devices heavily relies on middleware manufactured by other software vendors.
Because network devices are constructed using an OS and existing middleware products, the most crucial security issue is that of updating the network device software. Updating the software can be made difficult if the time required to update the device is high. While it is often possible for users to update both the OS and middleware over the Internet, users are generally unconcerned about updating the devices. Another reason that devices are not updated is because vendors eventually terminate their support services. The lack of support means that update patches are no longer available for a product line even though some of the devices are still in use.
Once an insecure network device is attacked, the device can be used as a springboard to attack other computers. Devices operating within a local area network (LAN) are usually protected from external threats due to the use of firewalls or intrusion detection systems (IDSs). However, an insecure network device can allow attackers to conduct an intra-LAN attack against computers inside the LAN, effectively bypassing firewalls and IDSs. In this paper, we propose a novel network system architecture that protects network devices from intra-LAN attacks by dynamically isolating infected devices using OpenFlow. Our preliminary evaluation results show that the architecture is effective in actual LAN environments.
In this paper, we propose a novel type of network system architectures for preventing network devices from an intra-LAN attack, by dynamically isolating an infected device from intra-LAN by using OpenFlow [2] on detection. Our preliminary evaluation results show that our architecture is effective and applicable in actual LAN environment.
Motivation

Network Device Vulnerabilities
Here, we describe some vulnerabilities that have been observed with actual network devices.
• First, Cross Site Request Forgeries (CSRF), were found in several broadband router pruducts designed and manufactured by multiple vendors in 2008 and in 2011 (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures(CVE-2008-0524) 1 and Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures(CVE-2011-1324) 2 . With these CSRF, a broadband router configuration can be modified from outside the LAN to cause more severe damages.
• Secondly, a Samba vulnerability was found in 2012 that affects NAS devices (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures(CVE-2012-1182) 3 . This vulnerability allows the NAS to be controlled with root permissions. root permissions allow any program to be executed on the NAS that acceses computers inside the LAN.
• Finally, a vulnerability was found in 2004 (Japan Vulnerability Notes(jvn50505257) 4 , that allows attackers to obtain full access control over an insecure video recorder without authentication. Attackers can use the recorder as a springboard to perform attacks on other computers within the LAN.
The above vulnerabilities are only representative examples of a much larger number of hidden vulnerabilities in network devices. There are three kinds of problems that hinder addressing vulnerabilities even after they are found.
• No support for update patches: When a device vendor terminates support, update patches may no longer be available.
• Delay in release of update patches: Even if the device is currently supported, the vendor may not release an update immediately after the vulnerability is found. From a JPCERT/CC survey in Oct. 2012 [3] , only 667 out of 7050 software vulnerabilities were addressed by update patches. The report also indicated that only 57% of update patches are released within 90 days of the vulnerability notification.
• User reluctance to install update patches: The network device user may be reluctant to apply an update patch to the device due to time constraints. The user may additionally be concerned that the update patch could result in device instability.
Intra-LAN Security
In this paper, we describe a scenario on intra-LAN security using a representative example that includes the vulnerabilities explained above. First, an attacker uses a CSRF vulnerability to modify the broadband device that allows a more severe attack to be performed against devices within the LAN. The attacker then executes a program on an NAS that destroys the NAS contents. Finally, the attacker moves on to attack other devices and computers within the LAN via the NAS.
If any network device is insecure, the entire LAN may be compromised. Even if a router effectively protects the LAN from external attacks, downloaded files, USB memory sticks, or external disks can potentially allow attacks from within the LAN. Once the LAN is compromised, intra-LAN attacks can result in substantial damage.
In this paper, a new network system architecture is proposed that protects network devices from intra-LAN attacks. The architecture dynamically isolates infected devices using OpenFlow.
Related Work
Xiong Liu et al. described an OpenFlow-based network system to implement a multi-level security policy that controls communication between multiple network hosts [4] . They suggested a method to restrict information flow from a high-security-level host to a low-security-level host. Although they used an OpenFlow-based secure network, the proposed network does not support intrusion detection or isolation of unsecured devices. Kai Wang et al. proposed a scalable network management architecture called LiveSec that used a new access switching layer [5] . The LiveSec architecture used both interactive policy enforcement and distributed load balancing, and it was implemented with OpenFlow-enabled switches. Although LiveSec is a novel network management architecture with a high-security policy definition, isolation of insecure devices needs to be executed manually due to the unavailability of an automatic device isolation function.
Y. V. Srinivasa Murthy et al. proposed a new approach to trace and solve security attacks in LANs [6] . Their system detects worms or other malicious information and stops them from spreading within the LAN. Their system adds special rules to an IDS such as SNORT. However, their approach only focuses on worm detection and removal, which is not effective for other types of intrusions. Udaya Tupakula et al. proposed a new secure network infrastructure called TVLAN [7] . The approach combines two existing technologiestrusted computing and virtualization. In TVLAN, all clients and hosts are connected within a virtual and trusted network. This type of network can easily avoid flooding attacks; however, it is assumed that a virtual machine manager (VMM) is installed on each client, which reduces the applicability of the network architecture. Li Li et al. proposed the use of a virtual honeypot for LAN security [8] . The virtual honeypot protects servers in the LAN from outside attacks. After an intrusion is identified, the system changes the iptables to minimize the effects of an attack. It is not clear, however, whether the honeypot concept can be used to detect and isolate an intra-LAN attack.
Masaaki Sato et al. proposed a new method for anomaly-based IDSs [9] . With the proposed method, unknown attacks can be detected by adding alert features and incorporating a class support vector machine. S. M. Hussein et al. also proposed a hybrid IDS approach that combines the signature-based and anomaly-based IDSs. With this combination, highly accurate detection can be achieved with very few false positives. The architecture proposed in this paper does not require specialized IDSs. Any existing IDS can be used in the proposed architecture. It is important, therefore, to use an IDS that will provide highly accurate detection with a low false-positive rate to increase the detection ability of the proposed secure network architecture.
Architecture
In this section, we describe our new architecture to protect network devices from intra-LAN attack. Fig.3 shows the basic concepts described here. As shown in this figure, we focus on a network structure within the LAN. In order to protect network devices from an intra-LAN attack, a new architecture is proposed to control intra-LAN packet forwarding in combination with an IDS. The following basic concepts apply to the proposed architecture.
Basic Concepts
• Employment of OpenFlow as software switches: OpenFlow is used to change the network configuration dynamically. OpenFlow is a Software-Defined Network (SDN) software package that enables networks to be software-controlled. OpenFlow allows network switches to be configured using programmable interfaces. The SDN software package also allows network traffic to be monitored, including inspecting and routing of packets, which is important for the intra-LAN secure network realization.
• Intra-LAN intrusion detection with existing IDS: IDS typically monitors network traffic packets to detect an intrusion from outside the LAN. We employ the IDS to detect and identify an insecure network device that may cause malicious activities. It is not assumed in this concept that a specific IDS is used. Any IDS can be used in the proposed architecture • Isolation of an insecure network device: Once an insecure network device is identified with the IDS, the device should be isolated from the network immediately. The rapid isolation of such a device is important to keep the network secure from further attack.
• Devices such as NAS, routers, video recorders or printers, in addition to PCs, can be supported in our architecture. As described in the introduction section, it is important to assume that a device, in which its driver is neither easily nor frequently updated, is connected to LAN. It is not practical to realize late installation of a software component in a device to keep the device more secure. A insecure device should be isolated without any software installation. IDS is used for monitoring network traffic, detecting attacks, and identifying insecure devices. The IDS also sends alert messages to the OpenFlow Controller.
Structure
The OpenFlow Controller has the three additional functions: packet forwarding check, device isolation, and path selection. In the packet forwarding check, the source and the destination of each packet are checked against the LAN information database to determine whether the packet should be forwarded. The device isolation function is activated when an alert message is sent from the IDS. This function isolates the identified device. The last function, path selection, selects a path for packet forwarding based on the packet forwarding check function. The path definition and policies defining how the path is selected are described in the next.
In this paper, it is assumed that the architecture can be implemented for a small or a medium scale LAN which is composed of the one or two-digit number of LAN devices. We also assumed that the speed of the LAN is 100Mbps. These assumptions are made for implementing the architecture.
Paths and policies for path selection
Path types are segregated into the following two categories: (1) IDS-first and (2) Forwarding-first. In the IDSfirst category, the packet is first sent to IDS and waits for processing at the IDS, whereas in the Forwarding-first category, the packet is copied and concurrently sent to both the IDS and its destination.
There are five policies for path selection. The policies are COMPLETE, HIGH SECURED, MEDIUM, HIGH PERFORMANCE, and BASIC.
• COMPLETE policy: All packets are transferred to IDS first. This policy results in the highest security possible.
• HIGH SECURED policy: This policy is introduced to perform secure packet switching with consideration given to switching performance. Either Forwarding-first or IDS-first is executed for a packet. The path is selected based on a predefined probability, α. Specifically, IDS-first is selected in the probability of α, while Forwarding-first is selected in the probability of 1 − α. The value of α is set and used in the range from 0.5 to 1.0 in this policy.
• MEDIUM policy: Either of the two path types, Forwarding-first or IDS-first, is selected at random in this policy.
• HIGH PERFORMANCE policy: This policy is introduced to achieve high packet switching performance with consideration given to security. Either Forwarding-first or IDS-first is executed for a packet. The selected path is opposite that of the HIGH SECURED policy. Forwarding-first is selected in the probability of α, while IDS-first is selected in the probability of 1 − α. The value of α is set and used in the range from 0.0 to 0.5 in this policy.
• BASIC policy: Both packet forwarding and packet checking at IDS are executed in parallel in this policy. Since no overhead is expended for IDS, this policy results in the highest performance. Due to the delay, however, a situation can arise wherein a malicious action occurs prior to intrusion detection.
Fig.5 describes these policies in the form of algorithms.
First, the received packet P is checked using the database WHIT E LIS T . If either the destination or the source of packet P is found in the WHIT E LIS T , then Forwarding-first(P) is executed. In Forwarding-first(P), the packet is directly transferred to the destination and a copy of the packet is transferred to the IDS. The WHIT E LIS T is manually prepared by a network administrator. If the packet is not found in the WHIT E LIS T , then it is checked against BLACK LIS T . If either the destination or source of packet P is found in BLACK LIS T , then the packet is discarded with discard PACKET(P). If neither the source nor destination is found in the WHIT E LIS T or BLACK LIS T databases, the defined policy is used to determine path selection.
If the BASIC policy is defined, Forwarding-first(P) is performed for all packets after checking WHIT E LIS T and BLACK LIS T . In the HIGH PERFORMANCE policy, path SELECTED(P, α) outputs either "Forwardingfirst" or "IDS-first" depending on the given probability of α value. If "Forwarding-first" is output, then Forwardingfirst(P) is executed. Otherwise, IDS-first(P) is executed. In the MEDIUM policy, either "Forwarding-first" or "IDS-first" is selected at random. In the HIGH SECURED policy, the same process is executed as in the HIGH PERFORMANCE policy but a different probability value is used, α. In the final policy, COMPLETE, IDS-first(P) is executed anytime a packet is sent. It should be noted that in spite of the policy selection all the packets received are sent to the IDS for intrusion detection process. The difference lies in the time when a packet is sent to the IDS. In COMPLETE policy, all the packets are sent to the IDS and not sent to the target device before the result from the IDS is obtained, while all the packets are sent to both the IDS and the target device simultaneously in BASIC policy. There are no differences on the capability of the insecure device isolation. The time on device isolation after detecting intrusions differs for policies.
Evaluations
In this section, we describe our experiments and the experimental results to demonstrate the effectiveness and the usability of our proposed architecture.
Set-up
The following environment and configuration were used to conduct our experiments.
• Open vSwitch [12]: We used Open vSwitch as a software configurable network switch in our experimental system. • Linux and kvm: Debian GNU/Linux 6.0 is run on an HP ML110G7 with a Xeon R31220 3.1GHz processor with 8GB of memory. The virtual machine environment, kvm, is used to conduct our experiments. Twenty virtual machines are initiated, including four virtual machines for IDSs. The LAN speed used in the experiments is set to 100Mbps. Our kvm parameter settings are shown in Table 1 . The reason for the use of the virtual machine environment is that physical network interface overhead should be avoided in our simulation.
• Snort [13]: Snort, an open intrusion prevention and detection system, is used for the IDS in our experimental system. Although Snort supports the statefull inspection capability, any other IDS can be used instead of Snort. It is because we only IDS intrusion detection function by sending all the received packets to the IDS and by receiving an alert from the IDS.
• No BLACKLIST and no WHITELIST: To focus on the main body of the process shown in Fig.5 , neither BLACKLIST nor WHITELIST, is used in our experiments.
Our experimental system is written in Python. The POX library [14] was used for OpenFlow Controller development.
The evaluation measures are throughput and round trip time (RTT). Both measures are frequently used for the network evaluation. Throughput is a measure of the average message transfer rate per unit time. RTT is the average time required for a message to transfer from a source to a destination over the network and then return an acknowledge message to the sender.
We check the throughput and RTT using Iperf and ping commands, respectively. The 16 virtual machines are decomposed into eight groups, each consisting of two machines. The number of simultaneous message transfer groups, is changed in the range of one to eight. To model devices other than PCs, each virtual machine only sends packets and receives packets using TCP/IP. A total of 60 values were obtained over a 1-min interval in one measurement. Five measurements were made and averaged for both RTT and throughput.
Experiments
We conducted the following experiments to evaluate the proposed architecture.
• EXP-alpha:The purpose of the first experiment, EXP-alpha, is to check the effect of α values on throughput.
We measure the throughput for α value in the range from 0.0 to 1.0.
• EXP-throughput: The purpose of this EXP-throughput experiment is to check both the effect of a policy and the number of concurrent connections on throughput. We used the policies: HIGH SECURED, MEDIUM and HIGH PERFORMANCE.
• EXP-RTT: The purpose of the last experiment, EXP-RTT, is to check both the effect of a policy and the number of connections on RTT. In this experiment, we also used the same three policies as in the EXPthroughput experiment. 
EXP-alpha
The result of the EXP-alpha experiment is shown in Fig.6 . In Fig.6 , the MAX curve of the throughput is shown as a function of the α value. The MAX curve is obtained using the following equation: MAX (bit/s) = TCP window size (bit) / RTT (s). A TCP window size of 16 KB was used in combination with RTT values obtained from the EXP-RTT experiment. From this figure, we can observe that the alpha value with the smallest throughput difference between the ideal case and measured values is 0.78. Therefore, the α value for HIGH SECURED and HIGH PERFORMANCE should be set to 78%. We can also observe that a 30-Mbps difference can be observed between the throughput value at α = 1.0 (65 Mbps with the COMPLETE policy) and the value at α = 0.0 (95 Mbps with the BASIC policy). When a network administrator selects a policy such as BASIC or HIGH PERFORMANCE, the overhead is relatively low, resulting in throughputs of 85 to 95 Mbps in a 100 Mbps LAN. The maximum overhead observed, approximately 32%, is associated with the most secure intra-LAN realization. This overhead is mainly caused by the use of the IDS. To improve performance, either a lower overhead IDS should be selected or the IDS should be combined with our OpenFlow-based framework. 
EXP-throughput
The result of the EXP-throughput experiment is shown in Fig.7 . As shown in this Fig.7 , the throughput values vary with the selected policy. HIGH PERFORMANCE indicates the best throughput among the policies considered, followed by MEDIUM, and then HIGH SECURED. Based on the policy definitions, the observed order is to be expected. All policies produce consistent throughput values when the number of concurrent connections is four or less. When five or more concurrent connections are present, throughput values decrease. The reason for this trend is that four IDS machines were used and the machine load is well distributed for up to four connections. The IDS machine load becomes larger when more than five current connections are established, however. Additional investigation on the IDS load and smart load balancing methods remain to be performed.
EXP-RTT
The results of the EXP-RTT experiment are shown in Fig.8 . In this figure, the effect of alpha value selection is shown on the left (a) and the effect of policy selection is shown on the right (b).
It can be seen from Fig.8(a) that the RTT value increases linearly with alpha. In the case of α = 0.0 (BA-SIC), the RTT value is 0.8 ms, whereas the RTT value is 1.45 ms in the case of α = 1.0 (COMPLETE). The difference in RTT between the COMPLETE and BASIC policies, 0.65 ms, is negligible. For the results shown in Fig.8(b) , the HIGH SECURED policy results in the highest average RTT, followed by the MEDIUM and HIGH PERFORMANCE policies. The fact that the HIGH PERFORMANCE policy produces the lowest average RTT agrees well with results from the EXP-throughput experiment; in contrast, the RTT value is not dependent on the number of connections. Therefore, the proposed architecture can be used to realize a secure intra-LAN. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel network system architecture to protect network devices from an intra-LAN attack by dynamically isolating infected devices using OpenFlow. The key aspects of our architecture are (1) OpenFlow switches are used to isolate infected devices, and (2) any existing IDS can be used to detect an intra-LAN intrusion. Five security policy levels are defined that allow network administrators to strike a balance between network performance and security. We conducted experiments to evaluate the architecture and show that the architecture is effective in an actual LAN environment. The main feature of our proposed architecture is that any network device other than PCs can be supported and isolated on intrusion detections in the device without installation of any additional software component in it beforehand.
There are many issued to be solved, such as 1) adaptable security level specification, 2) realization of more flexible and detailed security control, 3) development of a security management front-end for simplified operations by network administrators, 4) field-testing in actual networks. and 5) extending our architecture for a large scale LAN.
Especially, we plan to develop a method for automatic security policy control adaptable for LAN security contexts. Although we described five policies in our paper, the network administrator needs to specify a policy among them depending on the current security control situation. Even one of the policies is used, there is no guarantee for the policy to be effective in the future. As he or she is difficult to set the policy dynamically, an automatic or adaptable security policy control is necessary to be developed. We are currently developing two methods to realize the adaptable security policy control, which are score-based and rule-based methods. In the former method, the highest-score policy among scores calculated for each of the policies is selected. The latter enables to determine the policy, dynamically checking a set of policy control rules which are generated beforehand from a large collections of network logs containing packet headers and IDS alert information. We intend to present these methods in the near future.
